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Abstract—Throughout the years, social norms have been pro-
moted as an informal enforcement mechanism for achieving
beneficial collective outcomes. Among the most used methods to
foster interactions, framing the context of a situation or setting
in-game rules have shown strong results as mediators on how
an individual interacts with their peers. Nevertheless, we found
that there is a lack of research regarding the use of incentives
such as scores to promote social interactions differing in valence.
Weighing how incentives influence in-game behavior, we propose
the use of rewards to promote interactions varying in valence, i.e.
positive or negative, in a two-player scenario. To do so, we defined
social valence as a continuous scale with two poles represented
by Complicate and Help. Then, we performed user tests where
participants where asked to play a game with two reward-based
systems to test on whether the scoring system influenced the
social interaction valence. The results indicate that the developed
reward-based systems were able to foster interactions diverging
in social valence scores, providing insights on how factors such
as incentives overlap individual’s established social norms. These
findings empower game developers and designers with a low-cost
and effective policy tool that is able to promote in-game behavior
changes.
Index Terms—Social Valence, Interaction Style, Rewards, Mes-
sage Across, Serious Games, Promoting Behavior
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent research has focused on how social norms have an
impact on behavior in a wide variety of contexts [1]–[3]. In
particular, social norms have been promoted as an informal
enforcement mechanism for achieving beneficial collective
outcomes [4]. Our work focuses on the social valence of
interactions, which addresses the valence, i.e. positive or
negative, of how an individual tries to interact with their peers.
In particular, we define interdependent social valence as a
continuous scale with two poles represented by Complicate
and Help. There are several factors that may have an impact on
This work was supported by national funds through Fundac¸a˜o para
a Cieˆncia e a Tecnologia (FCT) with references SFRH/BD/144798/2019,
SFRH/BD/143460/2019, and UIDB/50021/2020.
the valence of social interactions. Kokkinakis et al. [5] found
that, in the context of a multiplayer online battle arena game,
usernames containing either player age or highly anti-social
words are correlated with the valences of player interactions
within the game. On the research field of social dilemmas,
Martinez et al. [6] studied whether regret and disappointment
could be distinguished on the basis of how these emotions
manifest themselves in social-dilemma situations. Their results
showed that while regret increases pro-social behavior, disap-
pointment provokes the opposite effect. In particular, regret
led to more generous offers whereas disappointment led to
less generous offers while playing social bargaining games.
Besides social dilemmas, researchers have examined the
development of interaction styles diverging in social valence
in general-purpose serious games. For example, Vegt et al. [7]
analysed how game rules change interdependent behavior.
Results showed that different game rules could generate
distinct reported player experiences and observable distinct
player behaviors that could be further discriminated into
four patterns: expected patterns of helping and ignoring, and
unexpected patterns of agreeing and obstructing. Besides game
rules, incentives (e.g. personal satisfaction, rewards, praise, or
recognition) have been shown to be a cornerstone in behavioral
economics [8], acting as behavioral moderators [9]. Therefore,
game designers should pay attention to the game elements, e.g.
rules, avatars, levels, or incentives, they employ to provide
in-game assessment of player performance. To the best of
our knowledge, there is a lack of research on the application
of rewards, notably scoring systems, as a means to promote
in-game behavioral change, in particular interactions with
different social valence.
In the light of this, our research goal is to study how
rewards have an effect on the social valence of interactions
in a two-player scenario. As an evaluation platform, we used
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a word-matching game named Message Across1, in which we
developed two versions of its reward attribution system, one
aimed at promoting competition and the other at promoting
mutual help. Notably, both versions keep the same mechanics
except for the scoring system, which is unknown to both
participants. This design decision induces the need of both
players to decode which is the best strategy to employ for
each version depending on the scoring system.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we
present studies that address the social valence of interactions
on interdependent scenarios. Section III follows, with the
conceptualization of our model to study interdependent social
interaction valence. Then, Section IV presents the method used
to collect data for our work, and Section V provides results
and discusses our contributions. Finally, we conclude our work
with a discussion on future directions, tackling the limitations
of our current approach.
II. RELATED WORK
Behavior change has been an emerging topic in the last
decade, covering a wide range of topics from identifying and
targeting bystander behavior and cultural issues in cyberbul-
lying [10], [11] to dealing with climate change issues [12],
[13]. In particular, serious games have been used as an
effective channel delivering behavior change [14]–[16] and
fostering activities that lead to learning [14], [17], [18], such
as in the health [19]–[21] or social science [22] behavior
fields. Nevertheless, the approach to promote behaviors has
a strong impact on the social valence of interactions. For
instance, while video games may motivate prosocial behaviors
by having prosocial content [23]–[25], they may also lead
to negative behaviors, e.g. increased aggression right after
playing violent games [26], [27].
Research on social dilemmas (e.g. prisoner’s dilemma and
dictator games) has focused on identifying factors that can
explain and improve cooperative behavior [28], [29]. Bhm and
Theelen [30] addressed the influence of outcome valence –
whether individuals will have a positive or negative outcome,
irrespective of their behavior [30] – and externality valence –
whether an individual’s transfer to the public good will have a
positive or negative effect on others [30] – framing on players’
willingness to cooperate in a repeated public good game.
The authors found that individuals’ social value orientation
is related to cooperative behavior. In particular, there was an
increased cooperation when individuals faced a situation where
they needed to decrease a collective loss by transferring tokens
that caused positive externalities on others.
On the same line of research, Farrow et al. [31] studied
whether valence framing impacts the effectiveness of a social
norm intervention on prosocial behavior. The authors used
two variations of the dictator game [32] that are structurally
equivalent in the range of payoff outcomes and their respective
theoretical predictions. While the positive valence version
1The code for the game is available online, hosted in the platform GitHub:
https://github.com/SamGomes/message-across (as verified at April 1, 2020).
shows a worker that has $1.00 and is given the opportunity
to allocate this amount between himself and another worker
with whom he is randomly paired, the negative version depicts
a worker that is randomly paired with another worker who
is endowed with $1.00, and the first worker is given the
opportunity to make the same allocation decision. The task
of the dictator is to distribute an amount of money between
himself and a worker with whom he is paired under two
different social norm interventions: the dictator is told that
most of the dictators in previous sessions transferred to the
worker an average of either $0.30 or $0.50. Results showed
that a social norm intervention can have a significant positive
impact on allocation decisions in the positive frame, although
this is only true for participants that were told that dictators
in previous sessions transferred an average of $0.50 to the
other worker. Regarding the negative frame, there was also a
significant average treatment effect of framing with respect to
the social norm interventions, since the positive frame elicited
an allocation of $0.310 and the negative frame $0.393. Follow-
up regression analysis suggests that there may exist important
dissimilarities on how participants decided to allocate money
across frames. These findings show that it is possible to model
behavior based on how researchers frame the decision context.
Another approach to foster behaviors is by defining sets
of in-game rules. In order to study how player behavior
that relates to team performance can be affected by game
rules, Vegt et al. [7] developed two versions of a multiplayer
game, varying in rule-sets, designed to elicit player strategies
of interdependence and teamwork. While interaction rules
were expected to evoke a strong feeling of interdependence,
goal-driven rules were expected to elicit competition in one
game variant, and cooperation in the other. These two rules-
set framework defines four interdependent game behaviors
between goal-driven and interaction-rules: dependent compe-
tition, independent competition, dependent cooperation, and
independent cooperation. Results show that competition and
cooperation goal-driven rules led players to experience com-
petition and cooperation, respectively. Regarding interaction
rules, they mainly stimulated dependent competitive behavior,
e.g. obstructing each other, suggesting that the interaction
rules may have overruled the effect of goal-driven rules in
the competitive game.
Finally, score systems provide a flexible approach to feed-
back, and can easily imply direct competition due to easy
comparisons between players [33], thus helping to differen-
tiate social valence levels regarding interactions. Cress and
Martin [34] studied the effects of rewards and punishments in
a public goods game. The authors concluded that both rewards
and punishments contributed to higher public player invest-
ments. Furthermore, when players did not know each other,
the effect was significantly more predominant when using
punishment. Given these prospects, we believe that studying
how to influence the social-valence of in-game interactions is
relevant to advance knowledge in this field.
III. TOWARDS AN INTERDEPENDENT SOCIAL VALENCE
MODEL
Based on the aforementioned research, we focus on the
nature of one’s intentions towards other players by formulating
social valence as a composition of a “social” component –
there is interaction between peers – and a “valence” compo-
nent – whether my intention is positive or negative towards
the other player. Notably, we address it with a continuous
scale with two poles: Complicate and Help (see Figure 1).
Firstly, we believe the positive pole is aligned with prosocial
behavior, representing an intent or behavior to benefit others
or the society in general. However, this does not mean that a
prosocial behavior necessarily implies that an individual has
to sacrifice his own goals. In our model, the positive pole
represents an interaction style of Mutual Help, leading an
individual to equally focus on both themself and the others
while performing their task. Additionally, we argue that a
positive valence is often correlated with behavior that promotes
social harmony. For instance, collectivistic cultures generally
have cultural norms that promotes social harmony [35]. In the
context of a game, this can be modeled as player focusing on
advancing their task while minimizing the difference between
their task progression compared to their peers. Secondly, we
propose that the negative pole is connected to the interaction
style Competition. In fact, although being of negative valence,
competitive interactions and competition fostering game el-
ements are known to play an imperative role on improving
players’ enjoyment and learning [36]–[38]. Thus, Competition
assumes that the player’s goal should not be bound to improve
themself, but instead to become better than other players (i.e.
improve their rank in the game). To reach this goal, we believe
that a competitive player can embrace two strategies: either
the player progresses further in the game when there is no
meaningful interaction, or they complicate and sabotage the
other players’ task progression when there is a meaningful
interaction. With this in mind, a competitive individual will
focus on maximizing the difference between task progression
compared to their peers.
Fig. 1. Social Valence Scale.
IV. METHOD
As we have previously mentioned, our goal is to understand
whether rewards have an effect on the social valence of
interactions in a two-player scenario. In particular, we evaluate
the effectiveness of score attribution systems in promoting
different social valence values. Therefore, our first research
question stands as:
• How does reward affect the social valence of interactions
in a two-player scenario?
In addition, we expect that fostering interactions with con-
trasting social valence values will have an effect on the differ-
ence between task progression among peers. In other words,
the difference between scores at the end of the experience will
depend on the scoring system. Hence, our second research
question is:
• How does reward affect the difference between final
scores in a two-player scenario?
The next sections cover the methodology used to collect
data to address our research questions.
A. Participants
Subjects were recruited in pairs through standard con-
venience sampling procedures including direct contact and
through word of mouth. Subjects included any local interested
in participating if they were at least 18 years old. Each
participant was asked to sign a consent form. There were
no potential risks and no anticipated benefits to individual
participants. We conducted a total of 37 tests. After data
analysis, four tests did not meet quality criteria, e.g in-game
data not recorded or questionnaires with missing answers.
Thus, our final data set comprises 33 tests, a total of 66
participants (37 males, 29 females) between 18 and 40 years
old (M = 23.12;SD = 4.09).
B. Apparatus
As we previously mentioned, we used the Message Across
game (Figure 2) to develop different versions of the score
attribution system. Message Across is a two-player game
where each individual has a four-letter word to complete for
each level, placed on the top of the screen. We decided that
words always share two letters in order to promote interactions
between players, since both of them need to interact with those
specific letters. Letters are presented on three different lanes,
and players can move their cursor to a lane and interact with
a letter. If both players are in the same lane, only the first
player to select an action is able to perform it, i.e. if both
players are in the same lane and player A presses and holds
before player B an action button, the action of player A is
considered while player B’s is ignored. There are two different
ways to interact with a letter: a player can decide to give
a letter to the other player or to take a letter for themself.
Notably, a player only has four actions to perform per level.
This design decision is based on the fact that, by having a
limited number of actions per level, players will consider the
cost of opportunity of keeping or giving a letter and follow
meaningful strategies, while still being able to finish their four-
letter word. When both players run out of actions, the level
ends. The reward system adjusts the score that is given to a
player based on their action (give or take) according to the
induced interaction style.
TABLE I
REWARDS ATTRIBUTED TO EACH PLAYER BASED ON THE ACTION A PLAYER PERFORMS, WHETHER THE LETTER IS USEFUL FOR THEM, HOW IS THEIR
TASK PROGRESSION COMPARED TO THE OTHER PLAYER, AND THE SCORING SYSTEM.
Action Usefulness Task Progression Mutual Help CompetitionMe Other Me Other Me Other
GIVE
YES YES
I am ahead 10
0 0 0We are equal 10
I am behind 0
NO YES
I am ahead 10
0 0 0We are equal 10
I am behind 0
YES NO
I am ahead
0 0 0 0We are equal
I am behind
NO NO
I am ahead
0 0 0 0We are equal
I am behind
TAKE
YES YES
I am ahead 0
0 5 -5We are equal 10
I am behind 10
NO YES
I am ahead
0 0 0 -5We are equal
I am behind
YES NO
I am ahead
10 0 5 0We are equal
I am behind
NO NO
I am ahead
0 0 0 0We are equal
I am behind
Fig. 2. Screenshot of MessageAcross.
The scoring systems are presented in Table I. There are
some rewards that are similar to both scoring systems such
as when a player takes a letter that they do not need or
gives a letter that their peers do not need, neither player
receives reward. On a singular level, the Competition version
focuses on promoting a behavior that increases the difference
between the task completion of the player and their peers. As
such, players have three different strategies to follow. Firstly,
they can advance their task progression and punish the other
at the same time. Thus, when both players need the same
letter, this version rewards players who take letters (their score
increases by five points) and punishes the other players (the
other players’ score decreases by five points). Secondly, they
can progress on their task by taking letters that the other player
does not want, where their score increases by five points.
Thirdly, players can just punish their peers by taking a letter
that the other needs, while they do not need it. This leads
to a decrease in five points in the score of the other player.
Moreover, give actions offer no reward to the player, as they
would not contribute to a maximization of the difference in
task completion between players.
In contrast, the Mutual Help version aims at minimizing
the gap between the players’ task progressions. Therefore, the
most important interaction scenarios are when a player tries
to interact with a letter that the other player needs. When
a player has less acquired letters than the other and gives
a letter that either they both need or only the other player
needs, neither player receives reward, as they would not be
minimizing the difference between the number of letters they
have already collected. The same happens if a player has more
letters than the other and takes a letter that they both need.
In this case, giving the letter to the other player is the best
option since it would decrease the difference between the
number of acquired letters. While there is a similarity with
the Competition version where players gain score by taking
letters that the other player does not want, the Mutual Help
version specifically promotes taking letters that both players
need when the player that performed the action has the same
number or less acquired letters than the other participant, as
it decreases difference between task progressions.
The experimental setup included additional material, namely
(i) a tutorial version of Message Across which does not
grant reward to any player for a give or take action, (ii)
a questionnaire with one item in a seven-point Likert Scale
translated to the local language to address the social valence
of the interactions the player performed regarding the other
player – “What did you try to do to the other player?” from
“Complicate” (-3) to “Help” (3) –, (iii) a questionnaire to
assess the preferred game version, (iv) a computer to run the
game, (v) another computer to allow the participant to fill
in the questionnaires, (vi) a touchscreen monitor to play the
game, and (vii) a GoPro video camera put on a tripod and
positioned approximately 50 cm in front of the touch screen
for observation of player movement and in-game activity.
C. Procedure
Before the experiment, participants were informed about the
experience and invited to sign a compulsory consent form.
They were also informed that they could stop the experiment
at any time. After receiving consent, both participants were
asked to be next to the touchscreen (as seen in Figure 3) and
received a tutorial regarding in-game mechanics and possible
actions to perform. Additionally, we allowed participants to
play up to seven rewardless levels in the tutorial version in
order to support the development of minimal skills to play the
game.
Fig. 3. Experimental setup.
When both participants felt comfortable with the game
mechanics, they played the two game versions in random
order without knowing which version they were playing at
each moment. Notably, neither player knew how the scoring
system rewarded interactions, which led the participants to try
to understand it while playing the game. Each gaming session
lasted for seven levels. After each gaming session, participants
were asked to fill in a scale addressing social valence while
playing that version. At the end of the experiment, participants
were invited to fill a questionnaire to choose their preferred
version of the game and received their compensation.
V. RESULTS
Our research questions address one independent categor-
ical variable, the score attribution system (with two levels,
Competition and Mutual Help) and two dependent variables
– the social valence, bounded between Complicate and Help,
and the difference between the final scores of both players.
As we mentioned, the social valence, representing what the
player reported as the dominant intention while playing each
game version, was measured at the end of each played version
through the question “What did I try to do to the other player
while playing this version?”. Participants answered using a
seven-point Likert scale ranging from “Complicate” (point -3)
to “Help” (point 3). The distribution of social valence data is
plotted in Figure 4.
Fig. 4. Distribution of average interaction intention values by score system.
Shapiro-Wilk tests reported a non-normal distribution re-
garding social valence values. Therefore, a Wilcoxon Signed-
Rank Test was conducted to analyse the differences between
both conditions.
Results of applying the Wilcoxon test indicated large-sized
significant differences in the social valence of interactions
between our game versions (Z ≈ 6.60, p < .001, r ≈ .812).
In particular, the data has shown a tendency for the Com-
petition version to drive participants towards “Complicate”
(M = −1.5;Mdn = −2;SD ≈ 1.60), and a tendency
for the Mutual Help version to drive participants towards
“Help” (M ≈ 0.74;Mdn = 1;SD ≈ 1.64). These tendencies
deem us to conclude that indeed reward has a large effect on
the social valence of interactions in a two-player scenario.
Furthermore, these findings shed light on how a reward-based
system aimed at fostering competition should be modeled. By
rewarding players and punishing their peers when the interac-
tion scenario implied the attainment of a letter both players
needed, participants implicitly perceived that situation as a
challenge, in which they had to focus more on competing. As
for our approach to induce positive valence, the interquartile
range was not as close to the intended extreme. We believe
that this less pronounced tendency to “Help” was due to a
wider range of possible interpretations, which depend on what
strategies the players applied. Another hypothesis is that, as
it is more common in ludic culture, players focused more
on completing their task rather than interacting with their
peers. Nonetheless, as seen in Figure 5, there is a significant
difference in the distribution of take actions between versions,
(Z ≈ 5.53, p < .001, r = .680), with an expected tendency for
the Competition version to drive players to take more letters
(M ≈ 3.60,Mdn ≈ 3.71, SD ≈ 3.77) than players of the
Mutual Help version (M ≈ 2.99,Mdn ≈ 3.07, SD ≈ .715).
In addition, we did not find a statistically significant differ-
ence in the final score between peers for the Competition
(M = 20,Mdn = 15, SD ≈ 17.28) and Mutual Help (M ≈
18.5,Mdn = 10, SD ≈ 16.98) versions, Z ≈ 1.10, p ≈ 0.27.
However, as can be observed in Figure 6, the Competition
version led to a larger variance in differences in scores
compared to the Mutual Help system, which is expected due
to the natures of the two promoted behaviors. Players in the
Competition version were expected to increase the difference
between scores, due to the punishing imposed when a player
took a needed shared letter. Conversely, Mutual Help players
were expected to decrease the difference between scores, as
the score system rewarded players for aiding the other player’s
task progression. Nevertheless, we expected to find significant
differences between the two conditions due to the way rewards
were computed for each case. For instance, contrary to the
Mutual Help version, rewards in the Competition setting did
not keep a fixed delta between players. While the scoring
system would promote a delta of ten if both words needed
the same letter, the other two meaningful take actions only
led to a delta of five. These differences may have hindered
how much players chose the optimal strategy of progressing
in the task and spoil the other player’s progression at the same
time. Moreover, we believed that the difference between scores
would be close-to-zero in the Mutual Help version. We argue
that this effect may be a result of either the complexity of the
reward function, which takes into account task progression, or
the competitive setting. Notably, the optimal strategy may not
have been fully understood by players at the finer granularity
of task progression, although they showed a predisposition
to keep a balance between scores. Altogether, the observed
results lead us to believe that we were able to address both
research questions.
Although we found strong results, there are some limitations
worth discussing. Our experiment was conducted with both
players in loco, contrary to other research such as Vegt et
al. [7] who used no direct contact between participants. This
may have lead players to feel social pressure regarding how
they interacted with their peer, since their reaction could be
communicated to the other player. Nevertheless, we aimed
at diminishing this effect by recruiting participants in pairs,
preferably knowing each other. In addition, we limited the
number of actions a player could perform per level at four. On
the one hand, this decision transmits the cost of opportunity
to players as they could not waste actions in meaningless
interactions. On the other hand, it may have subverted specific
strategies that require more actions to show effects. Moreover,
the limited number of actions may also create a bias, limiting
more “altruistic” interactions. Finally, we set the number of
common letters in a word at two so that players had fixed
opportunities to interact, instead of allowing the option to have
Fig. 5. Distribution of average number of take actions by score system.
Fig. 6. Difference between final scores by score system.
totally independent gameplays. We believe that future work
should address these limitations in order to verify whether
our results are not strongly affected by these variables.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The aim of our work was to investigate whether rewards
influence the social valence of interdependent interactions. To
achieve that goal, we deployed different reward attribution
systems in a two-player word-matching game called Message
Across. In particular, we considered two score attribution
systems aimed at moderating two interdependent interaction
styles with opposite social valence: Competition and Mutual
Help. We then measured what effects these systems had
in players strategies and reported interaction intentions. The
results indicated that players significantly embraced different
strategies and reported different intentions when playing each
version, aligned with our modeled valence poles. The results
presented in this work contribute to advancing the state-of-
the-art of knowledge in several aspects. First, we tested and
validated that strategies aimed for fostering competition should
include score functions that reward and punish players based
on how they interact in a game. In particular, competitive
score systems should aim at increasing the score difference.
As we have shown, this type of reward functions lead players
to change their social valence while interacting with their
peers. Secondly, mutual help may be promoted using score
functions that try to bridge the gap between the scores of
both players. While still rewarding players for fulfilling their
task, interactions that help peers should also be considered
as valid as the former. Finally, another interesting point is
how participants were able to understand the different score
systems as we designed them without being informed of those
details. In the light of this, our results may be applied as
game design guidelines to create reward functions aiming at
fostering interaction behaviors with distinct valence values.
Future work includes investigating whether individual dif-
ferences such as personality had an effect on how people
varied their social valence values. For example, we believe
that people with higher Agreeableness [39] would be more
prone to “Help” other players compared with people with low
Agreeableness. We also believe that studying different sized
words or words with different numbers of shared letters is
worthwhile to check how the length and type of the task
may have an impact in the players’ strategies and perceptions.
In addition, we would like to study how much participants
adopted the optimal strategy while playing both versions.
Measuring more in-depth the flow of the game would allow
us to study at a finer granularity whether the score differences
in distinct versions were a result of the proficiency of the
participants. Finally, we can study our social valence scale
more in-depth. For instance, as we mentioned in Section IV,
cooperation between peers can depend on the focus of the
interaction, i.e. the focus of the players can vary between
themself and others. Therefore, we can create more reward-
based systems to promote interaction styles such as Extreme
Altruism. In the same light, competition can be studied in-
depth to investigate whether players interact following an
healthy competition, where they try to fulfill their task while
competing with their peers, or a toxic competition, where they
do not care for their task or score because their main objective
is to complicate the other’s gameplay.
Our findings provide new contributions to the field of
automatic education and training, due to the importance of
behavior promotion for this research topic. Models such as
GIMME [40], that aim to optimize the collective ability of
groups of people interacting with one another, may use scores
to mediate students’ interactions, thus empowering collective
teaching in multiplayer settings. Additionally, the moderation
of interactions using rewards allows researchers to take a
more human approach to the integration of agents simulating
serious games players, besides adding expressiveness to their
simulation models.
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